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Toward A Formal Definition of Task Representation*

Richard D. Hockothorn
University of Colorado
Robert A. Fetter
University of Colorado

ABSTRACT
This paper addresses the issue of how tasks within an organizational
context should be represented from the perspective of a single
decision maker. Based on a previous paper (Hackathorn, 1981), this
paper presents a formal ism for task representation based on recent
work in the Knowledge Representation area. The formalism is
called Simple Associative Network (SAN). The implications of this
formalism result in the discussion of several issues, such as: (a) the
nature of task occurrence, (b) handling multiple task types of a task
occurrence, (c) means and goals as a specialization of task types,

and (d) control structures among task types.

INTRODUCTION

human action" after Ackoff and Emery
(1972) and Newell and Simon (1972). A

In a previous paper (Hackathorn, 1981), the
argument was made that the concept of

distinction was made between "task repre-

task needed to be formalized as a basis for
understanding how a decision process could
be supported using computer technology.
A task was defined in this paper in a
general manner as "a unit of purposeful

sentation" (i.e., a language for describing
tasks) and "task description" (i.e., an actual
description of a specific task). It is argued
that decision support is the management of
task descriptions.
The focus of this paper is to develop a
formalization of
task
representation

through the application of recent knowl-

edge representation research. This formalization will deal with the ambiguity of
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decision processes within the organizational context and will show distinct
levels of task abstractions. Finally, issues
for contructing decision support tools wi 11
be discussed.

SUPPORT OF DECISION MAKING
An important theme of the Decision Support Systems (D55) literature is the
emphasis
on
"support"
rather than
"replacement"

or

"automation"

(Scott

Morton, 1971; Gorry & Scott Morton, 1971;
Keen & Scott Morton, 1976; Alter, 1975,
1976,1979; Keen, 1980; and Sprague, 198Ia,

can be specified and, hence, the degree of
determinism. Other authors have noted

be used to assist managerial decision making, rather than replace the human involveThe tasks that engage managers
ment.

ferent degrees of structuredness for an
activi ty depending on their understanding

198 I b). The point is that technology should

within organizational settings are extremely complex and fundamentally ambiguous.
The specification of formal algorithms to

accomplish these tasks is very difficult and
probably inappropriate. Further, attempts
to apply technology to automate managerial tasks have often led to failure.

The literature of such fields as systems
analysis, information requirements analysis
(Teichroew, 1974a, 1974b), and more recently

office

specification

languages

(Cook, 1980; Ellis, 1979; Ellis & Nutt, 1980;
Hammer & Kunin, 1980; Tsichritzis, 1980;
Zisma, 1977; Nawojski & Konsynski, 1981)
deals with formalisms for describing activities of both humans and computers.
The deficiency that this literature has is

that it deals with the concept of "human

purpose" in a very shallow fashion.

that structuredness is a relative concept of
the observer. Different observers note dif-

of the activity and assumpti6ns about importance, etc.

Stabel I (1974, 1977) even

states that the structuredness of an activity is often an organizational policy deci-

sion, one based on payoffs to the organization balanced with cost of information

processing.

The motivation for "support" rather than
"automation" is based on the notion of
ambiguity with which a manager must
cope. This ambiguity causes a dynamic

tension between the pressure to act counterbalanced with the indecision of acting.
More precisely, the di lemma for a manager

is the choice of feasible actions that will

result in the occurrence of desired events,

leading to a goal. An important function

for decision support systems is to assist in
resolving the dilemma of planning actions.
This paper addresses an aspect of that
dilemma, that of task formulation.

For the most part, human purpose is acknowledged but then eliminated from these
formalisms. For most computer applica-

The next section will elaborate on the
notion of ambiguity in organizational ac-

application is specified at the beginnning
of the development process and may be
used at the end to evaluate the resulting
application. Note that the assumptions

AMBIGUITY OF ORGANIZATIONAL

tions, the purpose or functionality of that

about purpose are that: (1) the purpose is
static, specifiable, and valid; and (2) the

tivity.

ACTIVITY

Consider the following situation:

means of accomplishing that purpose can
be formulated. These assumptions consti-

Imagine that you're either the referee, coach, player, or spectator at
an unconventional soccer match:

tuted the essence of the terms "routinization," 11mechanization," and "automation."

the field for the game is round;

there are several goals scattered
haphazardly around the circular fi-

In the DSS literature, there is a strong
reaction against the automation of information processing related to managerial
activities that are "unstructured." The
term "unstructured" comes from the research of Simon and others ( 1969, 1976) to
indicate the degree to which an activity

eld;

people

enter and

leave the

game whenever they want to; they
can throw balls in whenever they
want; they can say "that's my goal"
whenever the>
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want to, as many

times as they want to, and for as
many goals as they want to; the

comprise the crucial elements of the or-

ganization or system. This decomposition

entire game takes place on a sloped
field; and the game is played as if it
makes sense (Weick, 1976, from a
private communication with James
March).

allows the manager to handle the complexity

issues through modularity.

An

event that is coupled to another or other

events is responsive to those events, yet

The above quote of Karl Weick's captures

the flavor of the decision situation that
most managers find themselves in. This
situation is in sharp contrast to traditional

organization theory that focuses upon:

"still preserves its own identity and some
evidence of its physical or logical separateness" (Weick, 1969). The notion of

loose coupling is similar to self-contained

tasks as described
1977).

in Galbraith (1973,

-

The degree of coupling between two events
has been characterized on the basis of the

•

Explicit selection of goals,

•

Rational formulation of plans to
achieve those goals,

activity of the shared variables of the two

• Efficient execution of the plans
through division of labor, and

events. The specification of events and
couplings is not a one-shot activity, as both
events and couplings may appear and dis-

appear over time. Any theory of coupling
must also take into account the nature and

Layers of authority relations and
incentives to control the above.

intensity of the couplings, as these can
cause the creation and dissolution of
events and couplings.

As stated by Weick ( 1976), the problem

Cohen, March, and Olsen ( 1972) describe

•

with traditional organization theory is the
following:

"People in organizations find

themselves hard pressed either to find actual instances of those rational practices

or to find rationalized practices whose

three general properties of organizations
or decision situations:

1.

outcomes have been as beneficient as pre-

scribed as a loose collection of

dicted, or to feel that those rational occasions explain much of what goes on within

the organization."

ideas rather than as a coherent
structure.
An organization discovers preferences more through

Further, Weick notes

that parts of some organizations are heavily rationalized, yet the large, remaining
section has consistently avoided rational
analysis. One wonders how such inconsistent and loose systems retain a sense of
identi ty across time, so that they can be
recognized and dealt with in some formal

Problematic Preferences. An organization is usually better de-

actions than acting on the basis of
preferences. It is therefore difficult to impute a set of preferences
to the decision situation.

2.

Unclear Technology.

The organi-

zation manages to survive, yet its

manner.

processes are not understood by its

A concept that attempts, at least in part,

members.
tr ial and

It operates more on
error procedures and
learning from past mistakes.

to answer the intriguing question of understanding consistency amid chaos is that of
loose coupling. Loose coupling suggests

3.

that most organizations or systems can be
decomposed into stable subassemblies that
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Fluid Participation. Participants
vary in the amount of time and
effort they devote to different

domains; their involvement varies
from one time to another. The
boundaries of the organization,

therefore, are poorly defined and
constantly changing.

These properties lead to several forms of
ambiguity concerning the decision context
within the organization (March & Olsen,
1976):

Ambiguity of Intention. Organizations and even individuals have

inconsistent and ill-defined objec-

tives.

2.

fluence on the procession of the lower and
middle levels (or subassemblies) of an organization, but have had virtually no influence on the higher levels. In fact, by

applying normative techniques to a fundamentally ambiguous setting, the organization might actually bE pursuing "inappropriate courses of action more efficiently" (Mintzberg, Raisinhani, & Theor-

et, 1976).
When one studies the individual decision
maker, it appears that the decision maker's

actions in complex settings could hold the
key to understanding the decision process.
Individual decision makers deal with com-

certain.

them down into more familiar, unstruc-

Ambiguity of History. Past events
are important, but they are not
easi ly interpreted. What appeared

Theoret, 1976; Payne, 1976). Use of prob-

plex, unstructured problems by breaking

tured settings (Mintzberg, Raisinhani, &

to happen may

not

really

have

happened; what really happened
may not have been intended. The
flow of individual actions produces

lem solving shortcuts such as satisficing is
also in evidence. Mintzberg and his associates (1976), through a four year study of
twenty-five decision processes, have been

able to subdivide the twenty-five processes
into seven distinct groups.

0 f these seven

a flow of decisions that is intended
by no one and is not related in a

groups, four have been found to involve
similar outcomes.

outcomes (March & Olsen, 1976).

The implication is that, with an appropriate representation, it might be possible to

direct way to anyone's desired

4.

normative theories have a significant in-

Ambiguity of Understanding. The
causal relationship among both in-

ternal and external events is un-

3.

sion settings. It is recognized that current

Ambiguity of Attention.

At any

point, individuals vary in the at-

tention that they give to various
decisions.

Participation in these

develop theories to model the ambiguities
of complex organizations. The next section outlines the initial development of
such a representation scheme.

decisions is fluid and continously
changing.

These forms of ambiguity indicate that a
revised theory of management is required

TASK REPRESENTATION USING
ASSOCIATIVE NETWORKS

in which goals are unclear, and standard

The previous section described the ambigu-

Olsen, 1976).

the manager must cope.

procedures are not applicable (March &
Mintzberg ( 1973; Mintzberg,

Raisinhani & Theoret, 1976) has begun to
address the problem of identification of
the manager's role in an organization in an

attempt to develop a normative theory for
management action in unstructured deci-

ity of organizational activity with which

Needed is a
representation technique that captures the
essential aspects of this environment. This
section suggests a simple representation
for organizational activity based on associative networks.
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The use of graph based structures to associate factual information was first introduced by Ross Quillian (1968, 1969) in his

Ph.D. dissertation.

Since then, many re-

searchers have adopted similar techniques
for knowledge representation (KR). See
Woods ( 1975), Brachman ( 1979), and Mylopoulos ( 1981 ), for a review of previous
research with associative networks (AN).

Note that the term "semantic networks" is

not used since it refers to the "representa-

aspects

increases the modu lar ity of the

representation.

The first representation level (i.e., 1-level)
relates

to the

implementation aspects,

such as the definition of the nodes and
edges of the directed graph formalism.

The second level (i.e., L-level) relates to

the logical aspects, such as assertions of

relations between two objects. The definition of assertions uses the terminology of

tion for linguistic utterances to capture
the underlying relations to words and to

nodes and edges of the previous level.

produce information from text" (Brachman,
1979). Hence, semantic networks have a
narrower scope than associative networks.

The third level (i.e., E-level) relates to the
epistemological aspects.
This level is

For the purposes of exploring alternative
representations for tasks, a simple representation using associative networks was
formulated and is called SAN for "Simple
Associative Network." SAN is a composite

of the Procedural Semantic Network (PSN)
of Levesque and Mylopoulos ( 1979) and
KLONE of Brachman (1977). Further, the
aggregation relation is handled in SAN in a

way similar to the notion of frames (Minsky, 1975; Bobrow & Winograd, 1976,1977,
1979). A frame is a structured collection

of properties (i.e., slots) that surround an

object, giving it the ability to represent

complex situations in a compact manner.
Many of the advanced, and more interesting, features of these AN representations

are, however, not incorporated into SAN so

that the complexity of SAN could be min-

usually missing in many AN representations
(Brachman, 1979) and is the subject of
current KR research. For example, the
epistemological level deals with the dis-

tinction between object types and in-

stances and generalization hierarchies of
object types.
The fourth and final level (i.e., C-level) is
called the conceptual level and deals with

the knowledge specific to the problem

context.

In the case of task representa-

tions, the conceptual level will define an
object called task along with its structural
properties. Also, a control structure will

be defined over a set of task types using
relations with the object type condition.

Implementation Level of SAN

im ized for the purposes of task representation.

The primitive concepts of SAN representation are based on a directed graph consisting of nodes interconnected with edges.
The node having an edge "going out of it" is

Representation Levels

The following sections will discuss the SAN
representation in terms of "representation
levels" that are built successively upon one

another (Brachman, 1979). The intention is

that the concepts and terminology of one

called the out-node for that edge. Similarly, the node having an edge "going into it"
is called the in-node for that edge. The
triple of (out-node, edge, in-node) is called
a link. Consider the following link:
A

level are used as the primitive units of the
next level. This partitioning of the SAN

.-----
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X

B

---1.

The nodes are labeled "A" and "B" respectively and the edge is labeled "X." Labels
on nodes and edges refer uniquely to tokens. The purpose of tokens is to allow
nodes and/or edges with the same labels to
be considered equivalent.

main object, while the in-node represents

the range obiect. For example, consider
the assertion "John is a student." This
assert ion at the L-level can be represented

at the 1-level by the link:

Moreover, the

John

sarne token can be used as both a node and

an edge.

f-

For example, consider the token

"X" in the following two links:
X
A

B

is instance of

student

--1.

We will adopt the following notation to
indicate that a link represents an assertion:

(John; is instance of; student)

Y

C

Note that the semicolon is a reserve sym-

bol that separates the relation token from
the two object tokens.

The implementation level of SAN can be
summarized using the Relational Data
Model of Codd ( 1970).

A SAN "database"

consists of tuples for the relation LINK
having the form:

LINK (OUT-NODE, EDGE, IN-NODE)
where all three attributes act as the primary key and have the same domain of
TOKEN. Note that in the relation LINK all

tuples must be unique, implying that there
do not exist identical edges between any

For a good discussion of the correspon-

dence of predicate calculus to associative
networks, see Nilsson ( 1980) where he discusses "structured object representations."
Ni Isson also suggests the extension of the
L-level to first order predicate calculus by

the addition of connectives (e.g., conjunction, disjunction, implication, and negation)
and of universal and existential quantification. The extension wi I I not be pursued
in this paper since it is not yet needed for
the purposes of task representation.

two nodes.

Epistemological Level of SAN

The next level up from the Implementation
Level is called the Logical Level, or simply

The next level in the SAN representation is
called the epistemological level or E-level.
Woods ( 1975) and Brachman ( 1979) criticize
most KR research as having vague notions

and I inks an interpretation equivalent to
predicate calculus. Hence, the link acts as

gues for the "formal definition of knowledge-structuring primitives" as opposed to

a binary relation that con be used to build

the individual pieces of knowledge values

an arbitrary complex network of asser-

(e.g., "John is a student").

Logical Level of SAN

the L-level.

The L-level gives to tokens

of their epistemological aspects.

He ar-

tions.

More precisely, a link at the 1-level represents an assertion at the L-level consisting
of a relation (corresponding to the edge)

and two objects (corresponding to the
nodes). The out-node represents the do-

Distinction Between Obiect
Instances and Object Types

The first aspect of the SAN epistemological level is the distinction between object
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types and object instances. An obiect type

is a set or category of objects, such as
"person." The object "person" does not

actually exist in reality; however, what
does exist are instances of "person," such
as John, Mary, and Joe. Hence, an obiect
instance is an actual object in reality,
while an object type is a classification of a
collection of equivalent object instances.
This distinction is usually clear for tangible
objects. There is, however, a significant
degree of ambiguity when dealing with

events and concepts.
The convention is followed using upper
case letters for labels of gener ic object

types and using lower case letters for ob-

ject instances and problem-specific object
types.

object instance to its components

(e.9., John has brown hair). An
aggregation assertion is indicated
in SAN as follows: The link above
asserts that "person" has a property attribute of "has hair color of"

through the special token "is part

of." A second link below asserts
that an object instance of "person"

(i.e., John) has a particular property value of that attribute,

namely brown hair.

(has hair color of; is part of; person)
The link above asserts that "person" has a
property attribute of "has hair color of"

through the special token "is part of." A

second I ink below asserts that an object

instance of "person" (i.e., John) has a par-

ticular property value of that attribute,

Abstraction Assertions

namely brown hair.

The E-level of SAN consists of three ab-

straction assertions:

1.

Classification. An assertion is said

to be a classification if a specified

object token (e.g., John) is a
member of an object type (e.g.,
"student"). A classification assertion is indicated in 5AN by using

the special token "is instance of"
as an edge:

Generalization.

KR researchers that the above three ab-

straction assertions are "primitive" (Mylopoulos, 1980). Also note that Smith &
Smith (1977) define aggregation and generalization along similar lines.

We will adopt the notion that the verb "is"
is reserved for these three abstraction as-

An assertion is

said to be a generalization if it

relates one object type (e.g., "student") as a subset of another object
type (e.g., "person"). A genera 1ization assertion is indicated, using
the special token "is type of" as an
edge, as follows:

(student; is type of; person)
3.

A mild consensus is developing among the

sertions, whi le the verb "has" is used to

(John; is instance of; student)
2.

(John; has hair color of; brown)

Aggregation. An assertion is said to
be an aggregation if it relates an
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form property attributes of the aggregation assertion.
Hence, the verb "is" is

more primitive and focused on the E-level,
while the verb "has" is an important building tool for the C-level.
Between the classification and generalization assertions, a hierarchy of object types

can be formed. The object types higher in
the hierarchy are generalizations of those
lower. Conversely, the object types lower
in the hierarchy are specializations of
those higher. Hence, one can say that an

object type is special ized into lower level
object types.

In the example above, note that John

student, as they may be radically different.
In some cases, however, values wi 11 be
inherited (particularly for default values).

the property attribute of "has hair color

value always presupposes the inheritance

of" from the object type "person." This
inheritance propagates through two levels

of the associated property attribute.

Property
of the abstraction hierarchy.
inheritance is an important feature in
many AN representations.

Definition of CLASS, RELATION,
and VALUE

Inheritance of Properties

(which is an instance of student) inherited

When this occurs, the inheritance of a

All objects (i.e., types and instances) are

At this stage of the SAN representation,

the mechanisms for property inheritance

related together through a generalization
hierarchy to the object type OBJECT (as

We can, however,

suggested by Levesque & Mylopoulos, 1979).

supply a few general properties of inheri-

OBJECT is then specialized into CLASS,

tance.

RELATION, and VALUE through the as-

are not fully defined.

sertions:
When an object is an instance of more than
one class, it will inherit attributes from all
the classes. In particular, when a class is a
subclass of another class (i.e., student is a
subclass of person) an object which is an
instance of the subclass (i.e., John), will
inherit attributes of both classes.
Inheritance of attributes is a convenient
way to extend and refine existing classes,
because of the cumulative nature of inheritance. It is in precisely this manner that
inheritance serves as an abstraction
mechanism, since objects are defined by

( CLASS; is type of; OBJECT)

(RELATION; is type of; OBJECT)
(VALUE; is type of; OBJECT)
OBJECT is also given a special property
attribute "has default of" that will be used

later to given object instances a default

property value if none is specified for that

instance:

(has default of; is part of; OBJECT)

showing how they differ from existing,

more general objects. Details concerning
the simi larities between objects are sup-

pressed (as shown by Levesque & Mylo-

CLASS can be further specialized into object types appropriate to the problem con-

text. As explained in the section entitled

poulos, 1979).

"Conceptual Level of SAN," CLASS wi 11 be
specialized into person, task, and condi-

We will also separate inheritance of pro-

tion.

perty attributes from inheritance of specific values for those attributes. For example:

RELATION is specializd into ASSERTION
and PROPERTY as follows:

(average IQ; is part of; person)

(ASSERTION; is type of; RELATION)

(student; is type of; person)

(PROPERTY; is type of; RELATION)

The class student will inherit the property
attribute of average IQ, yet the value
assigned to the attribute for the class

PROPERTY differs from ASSERTION in

person will not be inherited by the class

that PROPERTY gives "structure" to an
object type by attaching PROPERTY attr ibute to that object type. The implication
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is that instances of that object type should
have (in the normal situation) associated
property values for each property attribute. An example of the property attribute "has hair color of" was given in a
previous section.
On the other hand,
ASSERTION specifies a relation between
object types in general, rather than some
structural component of a particular object
type.

The only instance of the PROPERTY ob-

ject type is Jlis part of" corresponding to
the aggregation relation: '

The domain of a property attribute is un-

derstood to be the specified object type in
the "is part of" assertion.
The VALUE object type can be specialized,

as needed, into categories appropriate for

the property values of the problem context. For example, the specification of the

"state" of a condition has the range of
TRUTH VALUE, that is defined as follows:

(TRUTH VALUE; is type of; VALUE)
(true; is instance of; TRUTH VALUE)

(is part of; is instance of; PROPERTY)

(false; is instance of; TRUTH VALUE)

On the other hand, ASSERTION has two

To summarize tbe discussion of the Elevel, Figure I shows the generalization

instances, corresponding to the classification and generalization relations respectively:

(is instance of; is instance of; ASSERTION)

hierarchy of OBJECT, etc.
The boxes
indicate object types, while the circles
indicate object instances. The double arrows indicate the "is type of" assertion
(i.e., generalization) and the single arrows
indicate the "is instance of" assertion (i.e.,

(is type of; is instance of; ASSERTION)
To explicitly differentiate ASSERTION and

classification). The E-level is composed of

the objects above the dashed line, while
the C-level (to be discussed in the next

PROPERTY object types, each are given
differing property attributes. ASSERTION
object type has the property attributes of

section) is below the line.

domain and range:

relatively independent of particular prob-

The intent is

that the objects within the E-level are
lem contexts or situations, in contrast to

(has domain of; is part of; ASSERTION)

the C-level whose function is to model the
problem context.

(has range of; is part of; ASSERTION)

along with the general default of CLASS
for both domain and range:
(has domain of; has default of; CLASS)

Conceptual Level of SAN
The final representation level for SAN focuses on the knowledge aspects that are

(has range of; has default of; CLASS)

specific to tsk representations. As mentioned before, CLASS is specialized into

The PROPERTY object type has only a
"value" property attribute with a default of

VALUE:

person, task, and condition:
(person; is type of; CLASS)

(has value type of; is part of; PROPERTY).

(task; is type of; CLASS)

(has value of; has default of; VALUE)

(condition; is type of; CLASS)
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E-LEVEL
(problem independent)

OBJECT
--SZS
,1

CLASS
--

VALUE

RELATION

.

'1/
,

98Z

\

person

\

\
\

Fred

task

a nswer

phone

C-LEVEL
(problem
dependent)

\

TRUTH

ASSERTION

\

PROPERTY

is
instance

type

is
part

of

of

of

\

is

\

Figure 1.

Generalization Hierarchy

VALUE

ture-

false

The second task could be considered a

The object type "person" is self-evident;

the next sections will explain the defini-

specialization of the first:

tions of the "task" and "condition" object
(market product; is type of; task)

types.

(send literature; is type of;
market product)

Definition of Task

Three aspects are explained relative to
task definition: (a) property attributes of

Finally, the nature of task instances needs

task, (b) task specialization into means/

paper is to define a new assertion "is

goals hierarchy, and (c) the nature of task
instances.

occurrence of" to distinguish task types

to be specified. The approach used in this
from task instances:

First, the property attributes of task were

chosen to be:

(is occurrence of; is instance of;
ASSERTION)

time, actor, and pre-con-

ditions:
(has time of; is part of; task)

For example, consider the task "answer
phone" and an occurrence of it:

(has actor of; is part of; task)

(answer phone; is type of; market product)

(has condition of; is part of; task)

(*01; is occurrence of; answer phone)

The value types for these attr ibutes are:

(*01; has time of; 12:34 3/13/81)

(has time of; has value type of;
TIME VALUE)

(*01; has actor of; Fred)
Note that a task occurrence (and most

(has actor of; has value type of; person)

object instances for that matter) is referred to by an indefinite label, implying

(has condition of; has value type of;
condition)
Secondly,

task

can be specialized

that the occurrence is denoted in conversation by its context (e.g., "the phone call
that Fred had thirty m inutes ago").

into

lower level task types, such as "answer

phone" or "send literature."

Through this

Definition of Condition

specialization, a means/goal hierarchy can

be constructed.

The specialization of a

For the purpose of interrelating tasks in

task type can be said to be the means of

that task type. Conversely, the generalization of a task type can be said to be the
goal of that task type.

terms of a "control structure," the concept

of object type "condition" is introduced

into the task representation. The property

After Ossorio

attributes of a condition involve the con-

11978), higher level task types can be

dition state and the activation of that

viewed as "how do you do that?" The
means versus goal distinction introduces

condition:

the notion of purposefulness into the con-

(has value of; is part of; condition)

cept of task (Ackoff & Emery, 1972; Simon,
1969). For example, consider the two tasks
"market product" and "send literature."

(has state of; has value type of;
TRUl H VALUE)
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(has activation of; has value type of; task)

tivation of" is the directed arc connecting
a task (source) to a condition (sink). A task
occurs (i.e., is enabled and fired) when all
the necessary conditions for the task have
the state of "true."

Note that the condition state is initially
set to "false" and that the activation of a
condition depends-· upon the occurrence of a

As an example, consider the process of
making a sale. First, there must be product awareness on the part of a consumer:

(has state of; has default of; false)
(has activation of; is part of; condition)

task.

(send literature; has condition of;

person isinterested)

Task Control Structure
Through the use of the property attributes
"has condition of" and "has activation of"

When the following assertion is true:

(person is interested; has state of; true)

for tasks and conditions, respectively, a
control structure can be constructed that

is equivalent to Petri Nets (Holt, 1971;
Horning & Randell, 1973; Peterson, 1977).
Petri Nets is a digraph formalism that has

Then the task "send literature" occurs, and
product awareness results:

(person is aware of product; has activation of; send literature)

extensive mathematical treatment that
incorporates two complementary ways of
viewing a process: as a sequence of operations; or as a sequence of states.

Product awareness is the condition for
making a sales pitch:

There have been recent extensions of the
Petri Nef formalism. First, Hackathorn

(make sales pitch; has condition of;
person is aware of product)

(1976, 1977a) and Meldman & Holt (1971)
have used this formalism as a descriptive
Secondly, Zisman
modeling technique.

and the assertion:

(1977) used Petri Nets augmented with re(person is aware of product;
has state of; true)

cursive nets and production rules (Newell &

Simon, 1972) to define a specification language for office procedures. Finally, work
on Information Control Nets (ICN) of Ellis
(1979), Ellis and Nutt (1980), and Cook
(1980) has further extended the Petri Nets
formalism to include explicitly both control and information flows. A graphical

will cause the activation of the task "make
sales pitch."

(sales decision; has activation of;
make sales pitch)

technique has been refined to illustrate
ICN's as descriptions of office processes.

In our notation, a task type is equivalent to
the Petri Nets notation of transition, and a

The occurrence of this task

will result in the sales decision:

This condition enables either one of the
following two tasks to occur:

(take order; has condition of;
sales decision)

condition for a task is equivalent to the
notion of place. The property attribute
"has condition of" is the directed arc con-

(terminate contact; has condition
of; sales decision)

necting a condition (source) to a task

(sink), and the property attribute "has ac-
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depending on the state of the decision.
This type of control structure allows for

the richness of conflict and resolution inherent in the Petri Nets formalism. The

complete diagram is shown in Figure 2.

"(*01; is instance of; answer phone)" and
"(John; is instance of; student)." Whatever

distinguishes these assertions should be
handled as property attributes, such as "has

time of" as an attribute of task. Secondly,
create a new object type cal led "event"

and remove any connotation of time from
the task object type. The object type
"event" could then have the property attri-

CONCEPTUAL ISSUES OF
TASK REPRESENTATION
The current stage of using the SAN formalism for task representation has only
dealt with simple notions of tasks, conditions, and persons. Even at this preliminary stage, several fundamental issues of

bute:

(has occurrence of; is part of; event)

(has occurrence of; has value type of; task)

conceptualizing task representations have

surfaced:
•

Instances
tasks

Specialization of Task Types into

versus

occurrences

From the organizational behavior litera-

• Specialization of task types into
means/goal

•

Multiple task types for a single task

occurrence
•

Means/Goal Hierarchy

of

Relation of control structure to task

ture discussed in the third section, it is

apparent that specializing tasks into means

and goals is a gross simplification. The
quest ion is whether the means/goal hierarchy is a useful simplification that can be
extended in later work. In this paper, the
means/goal hierarchy is used to focus attention on the following aspects:

occurrence

a) Purposeful direction of action,

Instances Versus Occurrences of Tasks
As mentioned in the definition of the
"task" object type, a new assertion "is

occurrence of" was defined to distinguish
task types from task instances. The prob-

lem with this approach is that it creates a

b) Mechanism for creating task hierarchies (Sacerdoti, 1977; Pearl, Leal,
Saleh, 1981), and
c) Goal definition as justification of
past actions, rather than direction

of future action.

new assertion type with little epistemo-

logical basis for doing so. The argument is

that a task instance denotes the occur-

Multiple Task Types for a
Task Type of Occurrence

point along some time dimension. This
distinction is somehow fundamentally dif-

Expanding on the means/goal hierarchy,
consider the following example of a task

rence of an event that occupies a singular

ferent than (John; is instance of; student).

occurence:

There are two other alternatives for the

"occurrence/instance" problem. First, just
consider a task instance as a task instance.

That is, there is no difference between
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(*02; is occurrence of; make phone call)

(*02; is occurrence of; make sales pitch)

person is interested

1

,

send literature

person is aware of product

,

make sales pitch

person is deciding on purchase

terminate

,

-- ,

contact

Figure 2.

Petri Net Of Sales Contact
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make sale

(*02; has time of; 15:20 3/20/81)

in a system, each of which has events that
relate solely

(*02; has actor of; Fred)
(*02; has object of; John)
In this example, Fred makes a phone call to
John for the purpose of selling some prod-

uct to John. Note that "*02" is the occurrence of two task types, one is a "means"

the

particular

entity.

crete events, the order of occurrence of

events is one of many allowable sequences.

type (i.e., make phone call) and the other is
a "goa'" type (i.e., make sales pitch). The
situation can easily become more complex
with multiple means for the same goal or
multiple goals for the same means.

to

These events can occur independently
without the need for synchronization. If,
however, synchronization is necessary, this
situation is also easily modeled.
Nondeterminism deals with the fact that in a
Petri Net composed of a sequence of dis-

If more than one task can occur at any
time, then any of these tasks may occur.
The choice of which task will occur is
made in a non-deterministic manner (i.e.,
randomly or by factors that are not modeled). This feature reflects realistic situations where, when several things are
happening concurrently, the order of oc-

If the

ambiguity that was mentioned by Weick
(1969), Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972), and
March and Olsen (1976) is credible, then the
connection of means and goals within task
occurrence wi I I be even more nebulous.

currence is not unique.
Severa I approaches to exploring this rela-

This problem with multiple object types for

tion can be adopted:

an object instance is well known to KR

researchers. If an object instance (or type)

has multiple object types as its generalization, then the rules for property inheritance are ambiguous. This situation is no
longer a generalization hierarchy, but a
lattice formed from the partial ordering of
"is type of" and "is instance of" assertions.

a)

Simulation of control structure to
produce occurrence behavior,

b)

Analysis of occurrence behavior to
infer control structure, and

c)

Consistency of control structure to

occurrence behavior.
Relation of Control Structure to
Task Occurrences
As described in the section on task control

CONCLUSIONS

condition of" and "has activation of" form

This paper has formalized an initial representation for task based on recent work
with associative networks. The first part
discussed the nature of decision support
and, in particular, the inherent dilemma
faced by a manager. The next section
elaborated on the ambiguity of organizational activity. The fourth section ex· plained the SAN representation and its use

structure, the property attributes "has
a control structure that is equivalent to

that of Petri Nets. The issue then arises as

to what is the relation between the task
control structure and task occurrences.

Some attributes of Petri Nets are particularly useful in modeling complex systems
such as organizations. In particular, the
feature of concurrency and non-determinism provide extreme flexibility (Peterson,

1977).

Concurrency handles the notion of

for task representation. The fifth section
explored several of the conceptual issues

that surfaced from the SAN representation
when used for task representations.

two or more kinds of independent entities
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Konsynski, 1981; Tsichritzis, 1980;
Zisman, 1977);

The contributions of this paper are:
a)

An initial task representation built
on primitive concepts,

b)

Equivalence to Petri Nets
process coordination aspects,

c)

Discussion of task instances versus

•

Networks of commitments (Flores &
Ludlow, 1980; Searle, 1969); promises
(Lee, 1980), or mental images (Barbarie, 1981) among persons;

•

Belief versus Knowledge Systems
(Abelson, 1973,1979).

for

occurrences,

d)

Specialization of task

types into

means/goal hierarchy,

e)

Discussion of multiple task types
per occurrence, and

f)

Relation of task control structure
to occurrence behavior.

Finally, a previous paper (Hackathorn, 1981)
listed the uses for a task representation:
a)

Description. A descriptive statement of how tasks have been performed, such as in a case study.

b)

Specification.

A normative state-

ment of how the tasks should be
performed, such as in a system
design.

The issues raised by this paper are fundamental for evolving a practical representation for tasks within a decision support
framework. These issues are not artifacts

c)

of the SAN representation, but are fundamental to the nature of organizational ac'iii vity.

A future step is to integrate the concepts
and issues of the SAN representation with
related (but diverse) research, such as:

d)

•

Model Management Systems (Elam,
Henderson, & Miller, 1980; Elam &
Henderson, 1981; Konsynski, 1981);

e)

•

Process Descriptions (Ossorio, 1978;
Jeffrey & Putnam, 1980;

f)

Inspection of the task
Analysis.
description according to specified
criteria for consistency, non-redundency, etc.

Optimization.

The permutation of

a task description so that certain
criteria are maximized.
Maintenance.

The revision of a

task description based on changes
in task activity.

Prediction.

Simulation of a task

description into future time peri-

ods.

•

Information Control Networks (ICN)
(Ellis, 1979; Ellis & Nutt, 1980; Cook,
1980);

The most important use is the first. At the
heart of understanding ambiguous activi-

•

Planning systems (Sacerdoti, 1977;
Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth, 1979;
Schank & Abelson, 1977; Stefik,
1980);

describe accurately individual events, 0long with general patterns. The imposing
of organizationally sanctioned activities
should be analyzed in the same conceptual

Languages
Specification
Office
(Hammer & Kunin, 1980; Nawojski &

from recurring patterns. Therefore, the
greatest research problem in decision sup-

•

ties within organizations is the ability to

context as those activities that emerged
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by Computer, Academic Press, New
York, New York, 1979.
Codd, E.F. "A Relational Model of Data
for Large Shared Data Banks," Communications of the ACM, Volume 13,
June 1970, pp. 377-387.
Cohen, M.D., March, J.G., and Olsen, J.P.
"A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice," Administrative Science
Quarterly, Volume 17, Number 1, March
1972, pp. 1-25.
Cook, L. "Streamlining Office Proceedings
- An Analysis Using the Information
Control Model," Proceedings of National Computer Conference, May 1980,
pp. 555-565.

port is the weak and costly methodologies
for describing tasks. Hopefully, this paper
has been a contr ibution toward this goal.
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APPENDIX A. SIMPLE ASSOCIATIVE NETWORK EDITOR (SANE)

In the early stages of this work, it became clear that manual manipulation of any non-

trivial AN was infeasible.

Since the intent was to explore the implications of AN

representations of tasks, a tool was constructed whose primary function was editing these
networks. The editor for SAN, called SANE, was developed using the Micro-SEED
CODASYL database management system (Micro Decisionware, 1981). The SANE program

operates on 8080/Z80 microcomputers under the CP/M operating system. Given the
limitations of 50OK bytes for floppy disk storage, AN databases composed of 20,000 tokens
and links can be reasonably manipulated. The interaction with SANE is in the tradition of
LISP editors, with cursor control to the CRT terminal.

The SANE database uses a recursive schema definition similar to the typical bill-ofmaterials structure:

TOKEN

LABEL
O E I

LINK

The two record types TOKEN and LINK are related through three set types 0, E, and I that

are the roles of out-node, edge, and in-node, respectively. The only data item is LABEL in
the TOKEN record type.
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APPENDIX B. LISTING OF ASSERTIONS
CLASS
RELATION
VALUE
has default of

ASSERTION
PROPERTY
is part of
is instance of
is type of
has domain of
has range of
has domain of
has range of
has value type of
has value type of

TRUTH VALUE
true

false
person
task

condition
has time of
has actor of
has condition of
has time of
has actor of
has condition of
is occurrence of
has state of
has state of
has state of
has activation of
has activation of

is type of
is type of
is type of
is part of
is type of
is type of
is instance of
is instance of
is instance of
is part of
is part of
has default of
has default of
is part of
has default of
is type of

OBJECT

is instance of
is instance of
is type of

TRUTH VALUE
TRUTH VALUE
CLASS

is type of
is type of

of
of
of

CLASS
CLASS
task
task
task
TIME VALUE
person
condition
ASSERTION
condition
TRUTH VALUE
false
condition

of

task

is part of
is part of
is part of
has value type
has value type
has value type
isinstance of
is part of
has range of
has default of
is part of
has value type
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OBJECT
OBJECT
OBJECT
RELATION
RELATION
PROPERTY
ASSERTION
ASSERTION
ASSERTION
ASSERTION
CLASS
CLASS
PROPERTY
VALUE
VALUE

